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(47) 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT LAYS ANOTHER TRAP FOR UNSUSPECTING 
EMPLOYERS: LUPYAN v. CORINTHIAN COLLEGES INC. 
KEELY JAC COLLINS, ESQUIRE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary tenets of statutory construction is to effect the object of 
the statute and to promote justice.1  Likewise, when applying the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Legislature instructs courts to “disregard any error 
or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”2  However, in Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc.,3 the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in a matter of first impression, decided to effectively shift the 
focus of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to strict procedural 
compliance, as opposed to substantive rights.  Practically speaking, Lupyan 
compels employers and/or their insurance carriers to settle cases simply on 
procedural deficiencies, where the plaintiff was otherwise fully appraised of and 
given his or her full FMLA leave entitlement. 
Part II of this Article will provide an overview of the rights afforded by the 
FMLA, relevant to the Third Circuit Court’s decision in Lupyan.  Part III 
contains an overview of the relevant facts and procedural history of Lupyan 
necessary to gain a better understanding of the Third Circuit’s holding and its 
impact on FMLA litigation.  Part IV explains the practical impact of Lupyan.  
Finally, Part V concludes with practical guidelines for employees to prepare for 
post-Lupyan FMLA litigation. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Simply stated, the intent of the FMLA is “to allow employees to balance 
their work and family life by taking reasonable unpaid leave . . . .”4  Giving a 
nod to the challenges of the workplace, the FMLA regulations explain that the 
FMLA was intended to “accomplish these purposes in a manner that 
accommodates the legitimate interests of employers . . . .”5  Moreover, “[t]he 
FMLA is both intended and expected to benefit employers as well as their 
employees” by adding a measure of stability in the family that will increase 
workplace productivity and “encourage the development of high-performance 
organizations.”6  Accordingly, there can be no legitimate denial that, at least on 
a fundamental level, the intent of the FMLA was predicated on a concern for 
 
 * Employment Attorney, King, Spry, Herman, Freund & Faul, LLC, Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania.  With many thanks to my mentor, John Freund, a former member of the 
Villanova Law Review, for his generous support, guidance, and inspiration. 
1.  See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(c) (West 2014). 
2.  PA. R. CIV. P. 126. 
3.  761 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2014). 
4.  29 C.F.R. § 825.101(a) (2013). 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. § 825.101(c). 
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employees’ work/life balance, with the end of encouraging business growth. 
Designed to achieve these goals, the FMLA offers a twelve week unpaid 
leave of absence, during any twelve-month period, to eligible employees.7  The 
FMLA imposes a legal duty on employers to inform their employees of the 
conditions they must meet to be eligible for FMLA leave.8  Employers must 
also inform employees of their eligibility to take FMLA leave.9  A notice of 
FMLA designation must contain certain content, specified in the FMLA 
regulations, and the employer must provide it to the employee within five 
business days of the date of the request for leave, or within five days of the date 
that the employer receives sufficient information to determine FMLA 
eligibility.10 
Notwithstanding the above, the key right given to employees by the FMLA 
is to be reinstated to the same, or equivalent, position upon return from FMLA 
leave—or, stated in another way, the key obligation imposed on employers is to 
reinstate eligible employees.11  If, however, at the conclusion of twelve weeks 
of leave, the employee “is unable to perform an essential function of the 
position because of a physical or mental condition,” the employee has no right 
to reinstatement.12  To that end, the FMLA explicitly allows employers to 
require all similarly situated employees, as a condition of reinstatement, to 
obtain and produce a fitness-for-duty certification from their health care 
providers, certifying that the employee is able to perform the functions of the 
position.13 
The FMLA provides a remedial scheme for employees who were 
obstructed from exercising their FMLA rights.14  According to the United 
States Supreme Court, an employee may recover for procedural violations of 
the FMLA only when the employee can demonstrate a “real impairment of [the 
employee’s] rights and resulting prejudice.”15 
In Lupyan, however, although the record contained no evidence that 
Lupyan was actually prejudiced, the Third Circuit declined to affirm the district 
court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the employer, reasoning that the 
employer could not establish strict compliance with the FMLA’s procedural 
requirements. 
 
 
7.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012). 
8.  See id. § 2619. 
9.  See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.110(d), 825.219(a), 825.300. 
10.  See id. § 825.300(b)(1). 
11.  See id. §§ 825.214–825.215. 
12.  See id. § 825.216(c).  It is important to note, however, that an employer may have 
some obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to provide a “reasonable 
accommodation.”  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).  However, the FMLA, unlike the 
ADA, only provides employees with twelve weeks of leave time. 
13.  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(a). 
14.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2617. 
 15.  Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 90 (2002). 
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III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF LUPYAN 
Lisa Lupyan, an instructor with the Applied Science Management program 
of Corinthian Colleges Inc. (CCI), was informed of an employee’s right to 
FMLA leave from the time of hire, as evidenced by her signature on the 
acknowledgement form to CCI’s employee handbook that explained 
employees’ FMLA rights.16  Noticing that Lupyan appeared depressed, her 
supervisor suggested, in December 2007, that Lupyan take a personal leave of 
absence.17  Lupyan met with her supervisor, who instructed her to initial a box 
marked “Family Medical Leave” on her request for leave form.18  During the 
meeting, Lupyan provided her supervisor with a U.S. Department of Labor 
Certification of Health Care Provider form, dated December 17, 2007, 
certifying her medical condition as panic attacks and extreme anxiety.19  
Although Lupyan claimed that she never received an FMLA-designation notice 
from CCI, CCI claimed that it sent Lupyan a Notification Letter dated 
December 18, 2007, informing her that her leave was designated as FMLA 
qualifying.20 
Lupyan’s FMLA leave officially began on or about December 4, 2007, thus 
her twelve-week leave period expired on or about February 26, 2008.21  
However, on March 13, 2008, about fourteen weeks after her leave began, 
Lupyan’s physician advised that she could return to work only for limited 
teaching responsibilities “with certain restrictions,” including “minimal student 
contact . . . .”22  It was not until April 9, 2008 that Lupyan was medically 
cleared to return to full duty.23  On April 9, 2008, Lupyan was terminated 
because student enrollment was low and because she had not returned to work 
after her FMLA leave period expired.24 
In the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, Lupyan asserted a claim of Interference with Rights under the 
FMLA, alleging that CCI obstructed her from obtaining benefits under the 
FMLA.  Specifically, Lupyan argued that CCI interfered with her right to 
reinstatement by not following the proper procedures to apprise Lupyan that her 
extended leave was designated as FMLA-qualifying; thus, Lupyan did not 
return to work within the timeframe allowed by the FMLA.25  After the 
conclusion of discovery, the district court granted CCI summary judgment on 
the interference claim.  While the district court concluded that CCI “submitted 
insufficient evidence to create a presumption that the Notification Letter was 
 
16.  See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2014). 
17.  See id. at 316. 
18.  See id. at 317. 
19.  See id. at 316–17; see also Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., No. 2:09CV1403, 
2011 WL 4017960, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011). 
20.  See Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 316–17. 
21.  See id. at 323 n.5. 
22.  Id. at 317, 324. 
23.  See id. at 317. 
24.  See id. 
25.  See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., No. 2:09CV1403, 2011 WL 4017960, at *5 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011). 
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sent to Lupyan,” the court found, based upon Lupyan’s discussions with 
management and completion of Department of Labor FMLA forms, “more than 
adequate evidence that Lupyan had notice that she was on FMLA leave.”26  
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment to CCI on Lupyan’s 
claim of Interference with Rights under the FMLA. 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Lupyan asserted that she never received 
notice from CCI designating her leave time as FMLA-eligible, notwithstanding 
the employer’s claim that notice was sent.  Unlike the district court, the Third 
Circuit took a more formalistic approach.  Instead of considering the totality of 
the evidence in determining whether Lupyan received the required notifications, 
the Third Circuit conducted an extensive analysis of the parties’ burdens of 
proof with respect to the mailbox rule.27  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
Lupyan’s representation that she did not receive the letter was enough to create 
an issue of material fact for a fact finder to consider.28 
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
Even though the record reflected that Lupyan knew or should have known 
that she was on FMLA leave, the Third Circuit rejected the employer’s evidence 
of actual knowledge in favor of adhering to procedure that was not required by 
federal courts.  As noted by the Third Circuit, the FMLA regulations do not 
specifically require an employer to prove that written notice was received by the 
employee, nor does United States Supreme Court jurisprudence allow 
employees to recover for their employers’ procedural violations of the FMLA, 
absent a showing of “prejudice”.29  In contrast with the Third Circuit’s 
formalistic approach, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, 
considering all of the various FMLA notice requirements, “an employee can 
generally assume that she is protected by the FMLA unless informed 
otherwise.”30  In the absence of specific laws or regulations, however, the Third 
Circuit has extrapolated a rigorous FMLA notice requirement, where only 
written notice with a receipt confirmation can prove that notice was provided, 
even where the conduct of the parties indicates otherwise. 
 
26.  Id. at *6. 
27.  See Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 319–24. 
28.  See id. at 323. 
29.  See id. at 318 (citing Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 82 
(2002)).  See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2013). 
30.  Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 726 (2d Cir. 
2001).  The Second Circuit stated: 
In the present case, the FMLA imposes a legal duty upon the employer to inform its 
employees of the conditions that they must meet in order to be covered by the 
FMLA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2619.  Moreover, an employer must notify an employee 
who plans to take medical leave whether her proposed leave is covered by the 
FMLA before the employee takes the leave.  29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 825.219(a) (employer must, prior to employee taking leave, notify 
employee that employee is ineligible for FMLA protection because she is a “key 
employee”).  Read together, these provisions indicate that an employee can 
generally assume that she is protected by the FMLA unless informed otherwise. 
Id. 725–26 (footnote omitted). 
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Notably, even if the notice requirements were not strictly satisfied, Lupyan 
had no right to reinstatement, thus she could not demonstrate “prejudice.”  Even 
after fourteen weeks of leave, Lupyan’s health care provider could not certify 
Lupyan to return to full duty.  The CCI, therefore, had no obligation to reinstate 
Lupyan following the FMLA-leave period.31  Because Lupyan had no right to 
reinstatement, she could not demonstrate prejudice by any potential lapse on the 
part of her employer. 
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision departed from the FMLA’s 
legislative intent, i.e., to strengthen businesses by strengthening the family 
bonds of employees in the workforce.  Imposing onerous procedural 
requirements on businesses, even while all of the substantive requirements of 
the FMLA have been satisfied, will only serve to create confusion in the 
implementation of the FMLA and fear of liability, without any real substantive 
benefit to employees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of Lupyan was the court’s focus on the 
employer’s compliance with procedural notice requirements, without a showing 
of prejudice to the employee.  For employers, this holding provides even more 
reason to be fully prepared for litigation, even when the employee cannot return 
to work and has exhausted all FMLA-protected rights.  Following Lupyan, it 
goes without saying that all FMLA notifications must be written, with receipt 
acknowledged by the employee, even where it is clear that the employee 
understands that the leave time is FMLA-qualifying.  The best way to provide 
written notice is to meet in person with the employee and have him or her sign a 
statement of acknowledgement in person, thus eliminating the possibility of 
employee or mail errors creating liability.  Alternatively, if the employee is 
already out on FMLA leave at the time the determination of eligibility has been 
made, a solution may be to send written notices via email, with a return receipt 
requested. 
Regardless of how employers and their insurance carriers decide to manage 
the increased risk in an ever-growing area of liability, Lupyan is a call to be 
mindful that, however noble the Legislature’s intention, FMLA implementation 
is a Sisyphean task for employers.  Whenever the FMLA requirements appear to 
be settled, the unwary employer may be trapped by a new requirement, most of 
which inure to the benefit of employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
31.  Notwithstanding potential obligations under other laws, such as the ADA, the 
FMLA does not require employers to provide accommodations for employees to perform their 
job.  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c).  Here, Lupyan’s health care provider indicated that Lupyan 
could only handle limited contact with students.  See Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 324.  Undeniably, 
contact with students is a core function of the position of an instructor.   
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